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Abstract
With more than 60 percent of all Korean households having high-speed Internet access, Korea is one of
the world’s most wired countries.1) According to the United States Trade Representative (USTR), and
others, many Koreans use this high-speed access not only to surf the web but also to trade in pirated
goods.2) Many U.S. companies alleging harm  from this piracy currently lobby the Korean Government -
often through the USTR - to continue to improve the enforcement and establishment of non-resident
copyright protection in Korea.3)
At a general level, this international struggle between United States producers and Korean consumers is
the same struggle that exists between producers and consumers within the United States itself. For
example, in the U.S., domestic producers of goods protected by copyright laws lobby the United States
government for increased copyright protection. Simultaneously, domestic consumers lobby the same
government for increased access to protected goods. This struggle is inherent in the United States
constitutional authority that allows for copyright protection in order “[t]o promote the progress of
science and useful arts.”4) That is to say, the constitutional authority behind copyright protection “seeks to
encourage creativity without unduly hindering the public’s access.”5)
One difference in this international arena is that Korea’s copyright policy is being heavily influenced by
an outside source. The outcome of the struggle between incentive and access in Korea is being largely
decided by the United States. Such a model can lead to neglect of domestic Korean consumer interests.
Instead of the Korean market dictating Korean copyright policy, U.S. producers of videos, music, and




Domestic policy dictated by foreign pressure can lead to domestic resentment in at
least two ways: first, regardless of market conditions, resentment towards outside
control, and second, resentment resulting from disproportional rights between
producers and consumers because of market conditions.  
If left to market forces, supply and demand will establish a balance between access
and incentive.  Such a balance is promoted by a balance in political pressure from
domestic consumers and producers on the domestic government concerning copyright
protection.  However, if the rights of domestic producers and consumers are balanced
via a foreign source, there is greater risk of establishing domestically disproportional
rights, i.e., the rights domestic consumers lose may not be balanced by what rights
their domestic producer counterparts gain and vice versa. This would then promote an
imbalance in political pressure on the domestic government concerning copyright
protection. The upset party often will look outside its borders to vent frustration.
Over the past 200 years, the United States has allowed its copyright policy to be
determined by domestic market forces. In contrast the United States puts international
pressure on Korea to adopt “international” copyright standards, resulting in rising anti-
American sentiment in Korea.
One alternative approach for the United States to strengthening copyright
protection in Korea is market-based. The aim of a market-based approach would not
only be to promote increased copyright protection for foreigners, but also be to reduce
anti-American sentiment in Korea. Furthermore, a market-based approach would be
more indicative of the approach the United States has followed to establish its own
copyright policy concerning non-residents within the United States.  
II. Copyright and the United States’ Non-Resident Polcy 
As mentioned above, the aims behind copyright law in American are as old as the
United States itself.6) Balancing rights between creators and consumers “[t]o promote
6) U. S. Const. art. VIII, §8, “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”
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the Progress of Science and useful Arts” has been the foremost recognized purpose
behind copyright law in the United States.7) This rationale was solidified in America’s
first copyright statute in 1790. In the United States this balancing of rights, however,
did not originally include non-residents. Barbara Ringer notes that historically the
United States’ non-resident copyright protection has been a policy promoted by
“intellectual shortsightedness, political isolationism and narrow economic self-
interest.”8)
The first significant sign of support for international copyright protection in the
United States came perhaps only as early as 1837, in a report by the chairman of the
Committee on Foreign Relations, Henry Clay.9) What became known as the Clay Bill
was introduced several times between 1837 and 1842, but never reached a vote in the
Senate.10) Subsequent legislation that sought to extend United States copyright
protection to foreign authors met strong domestic opposition.11)
Only on March 03, 1891 did the international copyright movement in the United
States take on any specific legislative form with the passage of the International
Copyright Act.12) Even though the Act claimed to provide reciprocal copyright
protection for foreigners, what became known as the “manufacturing clause” of the
Act severely hampered foreign publishers’ and other foreign copyright seekers’ ability
to obtain copyright protection in the United States.  
For example, one requirement of the manufacturing clause required any foreign
author seeking copyright protection in the United States to first manufacture two
copies of the foreign work in the United States before initial distribution and sale of
work in any market.13) Not only did this requirement hamper copyright protection for
non-residents, but it also gave business to U. S. publishers, one of the main voices
7) Id.
8) Barbara A. Ringer, “The Role of the United States in International Copyright - Past, Present, and Future”, 56(2)
Geo. L. J. 1050, 1055 (1968); see also id. at 1054 “[F]or a century after enactment of the first United States copyright
statute in 1790, . . . the United States . . . not only deny[ed] any protection to the published works of nonresident foreign
authors, but actually appear[ed] to encourage piracy.”
9) Ringer, “The Role of the United States in International Copyright”, at 1054.
10) Id.
11) Id. “[P]rincipally by American printing and publishing interests who believed that their livelihood depended
upon cheap reprints of English books.”
12) Id. 
13) Id. at 1056-57.
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against granting copyright protection for foreign works. This is an example of the type
of political balancing that takes place with those involved in copyright protection.
After the Second World War, the United States made significant advances in
promoting the copyrights of non-residents. However, even after the Universal
Copyright Convention came into effect on September 16, 1955, other hurdles to
foreign copyright protection remained.14) Some point to the United States’ 1988
accession to the Berne Convention - considered by many to be the main international
treaty regarding copyright protection - as the United States’ true recognition of non-
resident copyright protection.  It is significant to note that the United States’ ratification
of the Berne Convention came over 100 years after the Convention originally came
into being, and almost 200 years after the enactment of the American Copyright
Statute of 1790. That means if we believe both Ringer and the USTR, over the past
200 years the United States has grown from a pirate to one of the leading proponents
for establishment and enforcement of international copyright laws against piracy.15)
Why this change in policy for the United States; why did it take 200 years; why is
the U.S. now pressuring countries like Korea to change along with it? The United
States’ original stance in 1790 of domestic dominance concerning copyright
protection, and its resistance towards foreign pressure for international copyright
protection, could be explained by its perception that granting reciprocal non-resident
copyright protection would have the result of a net economic loss to the United States’
domestic market. The United States’ change in policy from isolation to exploitation of
international copyright protection follows continuing developments in the United
States’ domestic market and its position in the global market. Perhaps most
importantly, the United States “has gone from a net importer of copyrighted works to
the world’s largest net exporter.”16) J. Thomas McCarthy goes as far as to say, “[I]f no
14) Id. at 1061-62.
15) “Economy of the mind”, The Economist Newspaper Ltd., December 12, 1989 (UK Edition) “America’s
government estimates that patent pirates, trademark thieves and copyright bandits cost American industry over $60
billion a year. At America’s insistence, measures to stop the idea-thieves are being painfully negotiated under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).”
16) Graeme B. Dinwoodie, “The Development and Incorporation of International Norms in the Formation of
Copyright Law”, 62 Ohio St. L.J. 733, 742 (2001) “Although the United States joined the Berne Convention only in
1988, it has recently sought to strengthen international copyright law with a zealotry displayed only by converts. But
the conversion has been fostered by economic rather than philosophical considerations; the United States has gone from
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intellectual property protection exists regarding technical and entertainment
information, then we have little to sell to the rest of the world.”17)
This is a far cry from the early protective forces of the “American printing and
publishing interests who believed that their livelihood depended upon cheap reprints of
English books.” Or is it? If the requests and concerns of the American printing and
publishing companies of the 1800’s are contrasted with those of the technological
companies that make up the International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) of the
2000’s their respective cries look very similar.18)
The IIPA is a group of private U.S. companies that has a large financial stake in the
international protection of copyrighted materials.19) It represents mostly companies
with large export markets: 
All types of computer software including business applications software and
entertainment software (such as videogame CDs and cartridges, personal computer
CD-ROMs and multimedia products); theatrical films, television programs, home
videos and digital representations of audiovisual works; music, records, CDs, and
audiocassettes; and textbooks, tradebooks, reference and professional publications and
journals (in both electronic and print media).20)
The driving force behind the development of foreign copyright protection in the
United States has been the domestic market of the United States itself. According to
the Economist, the United States attributes annual losses to United States industries
because of intellectual property infringements at $60 billion.21) If this figure holds true
for 1998, the IIPA would attribute roughly $308.2 million of the total $60 billion
yearly losses to piracy in Korea alone.22)
While the United States’ policy in relation to international copyright protection has
a net importer of copyrighted works to the world’s largest net exporter.” See also Ringer, The Role of the United States
in International Copyright, at 1059, “[T]he United States had become an exporter in the copyright trade and something
had to be done.”
17) J.Thomas McCarthy, “ Intellectual Property-America’s Overlooked Export ”, 20Dayton L. Rev. 809, 813 (1995).
18) Description of the IIPA, at http://www.iipa.com/aboutiipa.html.
19) Id.
20) Id.
21) “Economy of the mind”, The Economist Newspaper Ltd.
22) International Intellectual Property Alliance, 2003 Special 301 Report South Korea, 288, 289, at
http://www.iipa.com/countryreports.html. Please note that the categories and the years involved are different.
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changed significantly over the last two centuries, its “narrow economic self-interest”
perhaps has not.
III. United States Trade and Copyright Relations in Korea
One of the first recorded American-led trading expeditions to Korea was that of a
merchant-marine schooner the General Sherman in 1866. The circumstances
surrounding the fate of the General Sherman are debatable.23) However, one
description of the account of the General Sherman’s encounter with Korea is as
follows:
It is not well known that the US-Korean conflict dates back to July 1844
when the US Congress tabled a motion to trade with Korea - the Hermit
Kingdom. In spite of this, an armed American merchant-marine
schooner, the General Sherman, was dispatched to Korea to “survey” the
waters of Korea. 24)
This account continues by reporting communication from Korea to the American
ship regarding the government of Pyung-an’s lack of desire to trade with the U.S. ship:
In the 7th moon of Year Pyung-in (1866), a black foreign schooner . . .
dropped anchor at . . . the border of Pyung-an and Whang-hae provinces.
Governor Park Kyoo Soo of Pyung-an . . . sent Lee Hyon-ik, the deputy
commander of the Pyongyang garrison, to the ship with four eggs and a
message:
“You have reached the walls of our city when asked to stay put at Keupsa
23) Dr. S. Wells Williams, “Oppert’s Kingdom of Corea”, New Englander and Yale Review, Vol. 39, Issue 157,
509-21, 512 (W. L. Kingsley etc., New Haven, Sept. 1880).
24) Lee Wha Rang, “Sinking of the General Sherman: A US Marine Merchant Ship”, March 19, 2000, at
www.kimsoft.com/2000/Sherman.htm; see also Cesare Lomvroso, “Why Homicide Has Increased in the United
States”, North American Review No. CCCCCXCIV, 710, January, 1898.
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Gate. You insist on trading with us, which is forbidden. Your actions
have created a grave situation.”
When the Americans refused to leave and continued to sail up the river
toward Pyongyang, the American ship was sunk and all aboard were
killed. This unfortunate incident triggered a series of American attacks
on Korea. 25)
Having come halfway around the world to open trade with Korea, the Sherman
ostensibly ignored Pyung-an’s refusal to trade. After the Sherman failed to comply
with the request of Governor SOO to leave Pyung-an, Governor SOO and the people
of Pyung-an retaliated. Here, although there may well have been another cause for the
violence, it would not have happened but for the Sherman’s insistence on trade.
The beginning of U.S. influence on Korean copyright law dates back to a 1908
treaty between the United States and Japan.26) Since Korea was heavily influenced by
Japan at that time, Korea was also subject to the treaty.27) This treaty extended to
“American copyright holders in Korea the same copyright protection that existed in
Japan.”28)
The United States’ influence on Korea was officially revived in 1983 when the two
countries began bilateral discussions over copyright law.29) By 1985 the United States
was mostly concerned with a draft form of Korea’s third copyright bill.30) Korean
officials claimed the bill was of their own making, and that any improvement in
copyright protection in Korea should be reflective of Korea’s domestic economic
development, not the United States’ political pressure.31)
Despite the Korean government’s apprehension, 1986 and 1987 saw the enactment
25) Rang, “Sinking of the General Sherman”.
26) Il-Hyung Lee, “Culturally-Based Copyright Systems: The United States and Korea in Conflict”, Wash. U. L. Q.
vol. 79, 1103, 1151 (2001). 
27) Colonial control by Japan officially began in 1910.
28) Lee, supra not 26, at 1151.
29) R. Michael Gadbaw and Timothy J. Richards, “Intellectual Property Rights: Global Consensus, Global
Conflict”, 272-73 (Westview Press 1988).
30) Id.
31) Id. see also “that Korea had not yet reached a level of economic development at which increased protection of
intellectual property would be cost-effective for Korea.”
Marker Based Anti-American Sentiment
200
of a series of revisions to the Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Acts of Korea. R.
Michael Gadbaw claimed that these revisions were “catalyzed by a Section 301
investigation initiated by the United States Government in October 1985.” 32) (As
amended, Section 301 of the United States Trade Act of 1974 is meant to “promote the
adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights in foreign countries.”33)
Whatever the cause, the United States saw the revisions of Korea’s intellectual
property acts as a major victory in the battle over copyright protection for United
States producers in Korea.34)
At present, the United States government continues to use its political and
economic pressure to increase copyright protection in Korea for United States
copyright holders.35) One of the main forces behind the action of the United States
government in this regard is the IIPA, as mentioned above. The next section will
further discuss the role of domestic market forces in shaping the United States’ foreign
policy concerning Korea, and Korea’s response to continued pressure to protect United
States’ copyright holders in Korea.
IV.  Results of United States Pressure on Korea
There are many obvious and expected results of the United States’ continued
pressure to increase non-resident copyright protection in Korea. One such result has
been an increase in protection. However, this protection has been haphazard in many
instances and non-existent in others.36)
The IIPA claims “incremental progress” over the last year against some forms of
business software piracy.37) It admits a loss of ground concerning an “old form of
32) Id. at 272, but see note 2, at 272.
33) Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, “Special 301”: Its Requirements, Implementation, and Significance”, 13
Fordham Int’l L.J. 259 (1989).
34) Gadbaw, supra note 29, at 272.
35) United States Trade Representative, 2001 special 301 Report, 1-37, at http://www.ustr.gov/enforcement/
special.pdf.
36) International Intellectual Property Alliance, 2003 Special 301 Report South Korea, 288-303, at
http://www.iipa.com/countryreports.html.
37) Id.
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audio-visual piracy.”38) Furthermore, book piracy seems to be on the rise and video
piracy continues “unabated” in spite of attempts to stem the flow.39) The IIPA also
claims estimated trade losses due to piracy in Korea have nearly doubled over the past
four years - from $302.8 million in 1998 to $572.3 million in 2002.40) The IIPA chart
below tracks this progression.  
* The methodology used by IIPA member associations to calculate these estimated piracy levels and losses
is described in IIPA’s 2003 Special 301 submission, and is available on the IIPA website
(www.iipa.com/pdf/2003spec301methodology.pdf)
** BSA’s estimated piracy losses and levels for 2002 are preliminary, and will be finalized in mid-2003. In
IIPA’s February 2002 Special 301 filing, BSA’s 2001 estimates of $134.2 million at 47% were identified
as preliminary; BSA finalized its 2001 numbers in mid-2002, and those revised figures are reflected
above. BSA’s trade loss estimates reported here represent losses due to piracy which affect only UNITED
STATES computer software publishers in this country, and differ from BSA’s trade loss numbers released
separately in its annual global piracy study which reflects losses to (a) all software publishers in this




40) Id. at 289.
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[ Table 1 ]  South Korea41) Estimated Trade Losss Due to Piracy 
(in millions of UNITED STATES dollars) 
and Levels of Piracy: 1998 - 2002*
Industry
2002 2001 2000 1999 1998
Loss Level Loss Level Loss Level Loss Level Loss Level
Motion Pictures 27.0 25% 25.0 25% 20.0 20% 20.0 20% 20.0 20%
Records & Music 6.9 20% 4.0 14% 7.0 19% 10.0 20% 10.0 15%
Business Software
Applications** 121.4 50% 100.4 48% 177.2 56% 118.9 50% 115.7 64%
Entertainment
Software 381.0 36% 487.7 63% 157.0 90% 119.0 63% 122.1 65%
Books 36.0 NA 35.0 NA 39.0 NA 39.0 NA 35.0 NA
Totals 572.3 652.1 400.2 306.9 302.8
The IIPA indicates that much work is still to be done if the United States wants to
ensure complete or even substantial protection for its copyright holders in Korea. The
USTR’s Special 301 Report indicates that the United States Government agrees with
the IIPA’s studies 42) and addresses significant concerns with Korea by placing Korea on
its “Priority Watch List.”43) The Special 301 Report also notes advancement in the fight
against piracy and counterfeiting in Korea with orders from then President KIM to “the
Ministries of Information and Communications and Ministry of Justice designed to
strengthen their copyright enforcement efforts.”44) However, progress is limited, in part
because of Korea’s failure to provide full protection to works created after 1950.  This
is a specific example of how Korea has apparently been unable or unwilling to enforce
certain international intellectual property commitments - e.g., the WTO agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).45)
Another result of the United States’ continued pressure to increase non-resident
copyright protection in Korea has been a contribution to the rise in anti-American
sentiment in Korea, beginning as far back as 1866 with the General Sherman
tragedy.46) On its face, this incident had nothing to do with copyright protection;
however, it illustrates a harsh response to the United States’ efforts to impose the
wishes of its markets on the domestic markets on Korea. This is similar to the
relationship that exists today between the United States and Korea involving non-
resident copyright protection. 
A second example of a harsh Korean response to United States trade policy (more
specifically related to copyright law) occurred with the 1908 treaty between the United
States and Japan.47) Korea resented Japan’s ensuing occupation and saw this treaty as
an extension of Japan’s occupational rule. 
A third example took place throughout the late 1980’s following the bilateral talks
between the United States and Korea concerning intellectual property. Many Koreans
did not want the revisions that followed these talks and resented the imposition of such
41) Id. Format of table has been modified.
42) United States Trade Representative, 2001 special 301 Report, 1-21.
43) Id. at 1-3.
44) Id. at 12.
45) Id. at 20-21.
46) Rang, supra note 24, see also Williams, supra note 23.
47) Lee, supra note 26, at 1151.
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change by the United States government. For example, “the Korean Publishers’
Association staged an ‘Anti-United States Pressure’ rally in which headbands were
worn to protest United States efforts at intellectual property reform.”48)
Friction . . . had been caused in the late 1980s by South Korea’s trade
surplus [with the United States]. Correcting and eliminating this trade
imbalance became the center of economic controversy between Seoul
and Washington. Although Seoul gave in to Washington’s demands to
avoid being designated as a “priority foreign country” (PFC) under the
United States “Super 301” provisions of the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988 economic policymakers in Seoul greatly
resented this unilateral economic threat. They also feared that the PFC
designation would fuel anti-Americanism throughout South Korea.49)
Although the United States was able to achieve broad intellectual property rights
reform in Korea during the 1980’s, it was almost exclusively through trade leverage.50)
There was very little support from Korea’s domestic market.51) This created an
imbalance between producers and consumers in Korea. As much as Koreans attributed
this imbalance to the United States, anti-American sentiment was the result.
The next two tables - taken from R. Michael Gadbaw, Intellectual Property Rights -
illustrate sources of domestic and foreign political pressure on the Korean Government
to improve protection for intellectual property rights.  
48) Id. at 280.
49) Library of Congress Country Studies, Korea - A Country Study, Relations with the United States (1990) at
http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/cshome.html.
50) Gadbaw, supra note 29, at 276.
51) Id.
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* Based on weighting of above factors given varying degrees of importance of each form of intellectual
property protection to each group.
* primarily involved in removal of agricultural chemical label requirements
According to Table 8.1, above, net domestic pressure on the Korean government to
improve copyright protection is negative fourteen. Foreign interests, mainly the United
States, create a net foreign pressure of twenty-one. The United States is lobbying for
something the Korean domestic market does not want. With regards to Chart 8.1, the
Korean Publishers Association exerts stronger pressure on the government than the
Korean Music Copyright Association (KOMCA), the Korean Society of Authors, and
the Korean Phonogram Association combined. This demonstrates the imbalance
between domestic innovators and consumers. There is an imbalance in what the
market wants and what the market is given; it vents itself in anti-American sentiment.
52) Id. at 278, format modified.
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[ Table 8.152) ]  Basic Political Pressures on Korean 









A B C A B C A B C A B C A B C A B C
Patent 3 2 6 -5 4 -20 0 4 0 -1 3 -3 5 4 20 4 12 12 15
Copyright 5 2 10 -5 3 -15 0 4 0 -3 3 -9 3 4 12 3 9 9 7
Trademark 5 2 10 -5 3 -15 0 4 0 -1 3 -3 5 4 20 5 15 15 27
Trd. Secret 3 2 6 -5 4 -20 0 4 0 0 3 0 3 4 12 1 3 3 1
Mask Work 1 3 3 -5 3 -15 0 4 0 1 2 2 3 4 12 0 0 0 2
Overall* 4 3 12 -5 4 -20 0 4 0 -3 3 -9 5 4 20 3 3 9 12
A = position of increased protection for this form of intellectual property
B = political impact (based on political influence of the interested party on this issue)
C = a*b
53) Id. at 279.
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For A: Total Column Key
+5 = favor Strongly
>24 = Strong net private sector pressure on government to
improve intellectual property right protection.
0 = no position
10-25 = Moderate net private sector pressure on government to
improve intellectual property right protection.
- 5 = oppose strongly
0-9 = Some, but minimal, net private sector pressure on government
to improve intellectual property right protection
-9-0 = Some, but minimal, net private sector pressure on government
to reduce intellectual property right protection
For B:
-25 to -10 = Moderate net private sector pressure on government to
reduce intellectual property right protection.
+5 = strong influence
<-25 = Strong net private sector pressure on government to reduce
intellectual property right protection.
0 = no influence
Total = sum of all columns “c”
[ Chart 8.153) ]  Private Sector Organizations
Active on Intellectual Property Issues in Korea
Favor Increased Protection Oppose Increased Protection




Foreign Agriculture Suppliers Group*
Korean Pharmaceutical Association
Korean Agricultural Chemical 
Association
Copyright
Korean Music Copyright Association
(KOMCA)
Korean Society of Authors
Korean Phonogram Association
Korean Publishers Association
On a side note, some scholars argue that because culture influences market
conditions, the United States’ misunderstanding or willful ignorance of Korean culture
could also be a partial cause of Korean anti-American sentiment. This paper accepts
this argument only insofar as such “misunderstood” culture truly affects domestic
market conditions in Korea.
V.  Conclusion
The United States’ markets dictate the United States’ domestic and foreign non-
resident copyright policy. This policy largely ignores Korea’s own market demands for
and against copyright protection. The resulting copyright regulations in Korea
disproportionately favor domestic producers rather than consumers and aggravate
Korean anti-American sentiment.  
As mentioned above, one of the main forces behind the United States policy for
international copyright protection today is the IIPA.54) The IIPA represents almost an
opposite image of comparable manufacturers that can be found in Asia.  “While the
Asian nations produce most of the hardware . . . such as televisions, CD players, and
PC clones, America supplies the content for that hardware—the shows, songs, and
software that makes the hardware valuable.”55)
If United States “content” providers use the United States government to achieve
their desired level of copyright protection in Korea, many domestic Korean consumers
of “content” goods will be disenfranchised. However, if there is sufficient domestic
support, i.e., political pressure from domestic “content” providers in Korea, to offset
the displacement of the “content” consumers we could expect a relative balance of
interests in the market. That is, any short-term loss to domestic “content” consumers
would be balanced by a gain to domestic “content” providers, i.e., innovators.   
Just as the United States allowed for domestic pressure to build over almost 200
years to dictate its full embrace of non-resident copyright protection, perhaps by letting
Korea’s domestic market dictate its own timing for embracing non-resident copyright
protection the United States would strengthen the relations it has with the older
generation of Koreans and create bonds with the new generation. 
54) Id.
55) See note 6, McCarthy, 813-14.
Journal of Korean Law, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2003
207
